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Why Smaller Secondary PE Managers Generate Superior Returns

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By Julien Marencic, Partner/Founder at Jera Capital as published in Insight/Out magazine #39.

In the Private Equity Secondary market, size is widely assumed to confer advantage — deeper relationships, greater deal flow, and stronger negotiating power. The data tells a more nuanced story. Smaller secondary managers, those operating below USD 500 million in AUM, consistently outperform their larger peers on every measurable return metric. The reasons are structural, not circumstantial, and they operate across the full investment cycle.

Access to a different deal universe

Large secondary managers are, by necessity, buyers of large transactions. A USD 5bn platform needs to deploy in meaningful size to move portfolio metrics — meaning it gravitates toward auctions of major LP portfolios and large-cap GP-led processes where competition is fiercest and pricing most efficient. The mid-market and lower mid-market, where the most attractive risk-adjusted opportunities concentrate, is structurally inaccessible to them at scale.

Bilateral Transactions

Smaller managers can source and execute bilateral transactions — direct negotiations with a single seller, without a formal auction process. These deals typically price at a discount to broadly marketed equivalents, as sellers prioritise certainty and speed over maximum price. Access to bilateral flow is a relationship game that rewards depth of network over breadth of brand.

Mid-market GP-Led transactions

The fastest-growing segment of the secondary market is GP-led transactions — continuation vehicles, single-asset deals, and tender offers. In the mid-market, GPs running these processes often prefer a smaller, operationally agile secondary buyer who can engage substantively on structure and close without the drag of institutional approval chains.

Pricing Advantage in Less Competitive Markets

Secondary pricing is fundamentally a function of competition.

The well-capitalised buyers compete for the same asset because of their need to deploy large amounts of capital, this leads discounts to compress and returns to normalise.

In addition, given that large secondary platforms concentrate in the same segment of the market, they end up bidding against each other and against other sophisticated investors (sovereign wealth funds, pension funds), so informational and structural advantages are not an edge but a commodity in that segment.

Structural Discount Capture

Smaller managers operating in less trafficked segments of the secondary market capture structurally wider discounts to NAV. A bilateral mid-market transaction may price at a 15–20% discount where a comparable large-cap portfolio auction clears at 5–10%. This entry price differential has a direct and material impact on net returns.

Complexity Premium

Many attractive secondary opportunities are structurally complex — cross-border jurisdictions, illiquid underlying assets, bespoke LP agreement terms, or mixed-asset portfolios. Large platforms often pass on complexity that their operational infrastructure cannot absorb efficiently. Smaller, specialist managers with deep structuring expertise can underwrite this complexity and capture the associated return premium.

Portfolio Construction and Concentration

A USD 5bn secondary fund deploying across 60–80 positions is, in effect, building a diversified index of Private Equity. Each position is too small to drive material outperformance, and the portfolio’s aggregate return converges toward the market average — less fees. A USD 200–400m manager running 10–20 high-conviction positions can generate genuinely differentiated returns by backing specific GPs, vintages, and sectors where they have proprietary insight.

High-Conviction Underwriting

When a smaller manager allocates 5–8% of its fund to a single secondary position, the investment committee applies rigorous, granular underwriting. Every assumption is stress-tested; every GP relationship is leveraged for information. At large platforms, the same position size represents a rounding error — underwriting intensity follows capital weight.

Vintage and Sector Timing

Smaller managers can express precise vintage and sector views without being forced to deploy at scale into markets they find unattractive. Large platforms must put capital to work continuously to justify management fee income on committed capital — a structural bias toward activity that is not always aligned with optimal timing.

Operational Speed and Decision-Making

In the secondary market, speed of execution is a source of return, not merely a convenience. Sellers value certainty. GPs running continuation vehicles have timelines driven by underlying business needs. The buyer who can provide a credible, final offer in days rather than weeks commands a structural advantage — often expressed in better pricing, exclusivity, or preferred access to future deal flow.

Lean Investment Committees

Smaller managers operate with compact decision-making structures. A founding team with full investment authority can move from initial screening to binding offer in a compressed timeframe. Large institutions route every transaction through layered approval processes — legal, compliance, investment committee, risk — each adding days and introducing the risk of re-trades.

Relationship Compounding

Counterparties remember who closed cleanly and on time. Smaller secondary managers who execute with discipline build reputations that generate proprietary deal flow in subsequent cycles — a compounding advantage that does not appear on any league table but is a durable source of alpha over time.

Alignment of Interests and Fee Dynamics

At large secondary platforms, management fee income on multi-billion AUM bases is substantial — often sufficient to sustain the business regardless of investment performance. This creates a structural incentive to grow AUM, even when deployment opportunities are limited or pricing is unattractive. The business interest and the LP interest diverge.

Carry-Driven Economics

Smaller managers derive the overwhelming majority of their economic upside from carried interest on realised returns. Management fees cover costs; carry builds wealth. This alignment is direct and unambiguous — the GP profits only when LPs profit. At scale, this relationship is diluted by the sheer volume of fee income that accrues irrespective of performance.

GP Commitment

Founding partners at smaller managers typically commit meaningful personal capital alongside LPs — often 2–5% of fund size from personal balance sheets. This is not symbolic; it is a genuine alignment of downside risk. At large institutions, individual GP commitments are a negligible fraction of total AUM and rarely reflect genuine economic exposure.

The Evidence: Preqin Data Across 484 Funds

The performance advantage of smaller secondary managers is not merely theoretical — it is consistently documented in fund-level data. Analysis of 484 secondary funds in the Preqin benchmark database, covering vintages through 2023, produces a clear and consistentc picture across every return metric.

 Fund commitment sizes
Metric<USD 500m≥USD 500m
Mean Net IRR (%)19.4%16.4%
Median Net Multiple (x)1.610x1.487x
% of Funds in 1st Quartile26 %18 %
% of Funds in 4st Quartile12 %20 %

Sourse: Preqin

The quartile data is particularly striking. Sub-USD 500m managers achieve top-quartile status 26% of the time while landing in the bottom quartile only 12% of the time. Above USD 500m, the pattern inverts: Q1 representation falls to 18% while Q4 exposure rises to 20%. This distribution directly refutes the notion that larger managers offer more reliable outcomes.

Conclusion: The Case for Focused Scale

The secondary market’s growth has created a paradox: as the asset class has matured and attracted ever-larger pools of capital, the structural advantages have shifted toward managers who deliberately remain smaller. They access different — and better-priced — deal flow. They underwrite with greater conviction. They execute with speed that commands premium treatment from counterparties. And they align their economic interests unambiguously with those of their LPs.

The Preqin data confirms what the structural logic predicts: across IRR, TVPI, DPI, and quartile distribution, smaller secondary managers consistently outperform. Size in secondary Private Equity is not a proxy for quality — it is increasingly a constraint on it.

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